The impending exit of City Football Group (CFG) from Mumbai City FC is not just another ownership change in Indian football.
It is a systemic warning perhaps the strongest yet that the professional football ecosystem in the country has reached a point of structural breakdown. When one of the world’s most sophisticated multi-club ownership models decides that Indian football is no longer worth sustaining at the top-tier club level, the problem is no longer about individual mismanagement. It is about governance failure at the very core of the sport .
CFG entered Indian football in November 2019, acquiring a 65% stake in Mumbai City FC and rebranding the club as part of its global “City” network. The ambition was clear: to create a flagship Indian club aligned with global best practices in recruitment, coaching, sports science, and commercial operations. On the pitch, the project succeeded. Mumbai City FC won two ISL League Winners’ Shields, two ISL Cups, and became the first Indian club to register a victory in the AFC Champions League. By any sporting metric, it was the most successful club project in modern Indian football.
Yet, despite this success, CFG has chosen to walk away. The reason lies not in results, but in the institutional collapse surrounding the Indian Super League (ISL).
The immediate trigger for the crisis is the expiry of the 15-year Master Rights Agreement (MRA) between the All India Football Federation (AIFF) and Football Sports Development Limited (FSDL) on December 8, 2025. The MRA had formed the commercial backbone of the ISL since its inception in 2014, granting FSDL exclusive rights to operate and monetise the league. As legal disputes over the AIFF constitution reached the Supreme Court, the federation was restrained from renewing or entering into fresh commercial agreements. What followed was regulatory paralysis.
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The consequences became starkly visible in October 2025, when a tender floated for ISL commercial and broadcast rights failed to attract even a single bidder. In modern sports economics, this is catastrophic. A league without a broadcast partner has no commercial future, and the absence of bids signalled that the market had completely lost confidence in Indian football’s governance framework. Litigation risk, the lack of a confirmed league calendar, declining viewership trends, and years of accumulated financial losses combined to render the ISL commercially unviable.
For CFG, this uncertainty translated directly into financial risk. While Mumbai City FC generated approximately ₹51 crore in revenue in FY2024, operational costs continued to rise, and long-term planning became impossible without clarity on league structure, scheduling, or media income. In CFG’s global portfolio, where clubs are increasingly required to show pathways to sustainability, an Indian club trapped in legal limbo became an institutional liability rather than a strategic asset.
The exit also exposes a deeper constitutional conflict within Indian football. In December 2025, twelve ISL clubs formally demanded amendments to key AIFF constitutional clauses that prevent clubs from owning and operating the league collectively. Articles governing authority, ownership, and financial timelines effectively block a club-led league model similar to the English Premier League. The clubs proposed a perpetual league company structure, with majority ownership vested in participating teams and a special share retained by the AIFF.
The proposal was rejected at the AIFF Annual General Meeting, reinforcing the federation’s insistence on centralised control. This rejection has pushed Indian football into an extraordinary situation: a national federation attempting to run a professional league without commercial partners, even suggesting the use of its fixed deposits to fund operations. It is a model entirely disconnected from global football realities.
CFG’s withdrawal from club ownership, however, does not mean a complete exit from India. Instead, the group has pivoted towards an asset-light strategy through Manchester City Football Schools in Kolkata and Bengaluru. These academies allow CFG to retain brand presence, tap into India’s vast youth market, and generate revenue without exposure to league-level governance risks. This shift is telling. Global football capital is not abandoning India’s potential; it is avoiding its professional structures.
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The fallout extends far beyond Mumbai City FC. Players are the most immediate victims. With the ISL suspended, contracts have been paused, salaries delayed, and entire squads left in limbo. FIFPRO has already raised concerns about mental health, contractual breaches, and loss of competitive seasons during players’ peak years. For the national team, the absence of regular high-level competition has weakened preparation and depth.
The crisis has also forced clubs into survival mode. Hyderabad FC’s relocation and rebranding as Sporting Club Delhi is a stark example of how fragile club structures have become. What was once projected as a stable professional pyramid is now a patchwork of rebrands, relocations, and emergency measures.
CFG’s exit carries serious second-order implications. Franchise valuations will fall sharply. Sponsors and broadcasters will reassess their exposure. Other global multi-club operators from Red Bull to private equity-backed football groups are likely to view India as an uninvestable market under current conditions.
At its core, this is a governance problem, not a talent problem. Indian football has players, fans, and market scale. What it lacks is a regulatory framework that aligns with modern professional sport. The failure to renew the MRA, the inability to attract broadcast bids, and the refusal to empower clubs collectively have created a perfect storm.
City Football Group’s decision is the clearest verdict yet on this model. When global capital chooses to stay only at the grassroots level and abandon the professional league, the message is unmistakable.
Unless Indian football undergoes fundamental structural reform transferring operational control to clubs, ensuring commercial clarity, and restoring investor confidence the professional game risks prolonged decline and global isolation.
