The confirmed exit of City Football Group (CFG) from Mumbai City FC is not merely a change in ownership it is a damning verdict on the institutional collapse of Indian professional football.
When one of the world’s most sophisticated multi-club ownership models walks away after six years, the message is unambiguous: the ecosystem is structurally unviable, not just temporarily unstable .
CFG entered Indian football in 2019 by acquiring a 65% stake in Mumbai City FC, positioning the club as part of its global football network alongside Manchester City, Girona, and New York City FC. At the time, the investment was hailed as a turning point for the Indian Super League (ISL), promising best-in-class governance, technical expertise, and long-term vision. On the pitch, the results followed. Mumbai City FC became the most successful club of the ISL era, winning two League Winners’ Shields, two ISL Cups, and scripting history by becoming the first Indian club to win a match in the AFC Champions League.
Yet, sporting success proved irrelevant against a collapsing governance framework.
The immediate trigger for the crisis lies in the expiry of the 15-year Master Rights Agreement (MRA) between the All India Football Federation (AIFF) and Football Sports Development Limited (FSDL) on December 8, 2025. The MRA had been the commercial backbone of the ISL since its inception, granting FSDL exclusive rights to operate and monetise the league. However, constitutional disputes within the AIFF and ongoing litigation led the Supreme Court to restrain the federation from renewing or entering new commercial agreements, creating a vacuum of authority months before the deadline.
The full scale of the damage became evident in October 2025, when a tender for the ISL’s commercial and broadcast rights failed to attract even a single bidder. For a top-tier league in a country of India’s size, this was unprecedented. Legal uncertainty, declining viewership trends, the absence of a confirmed league calendar, and years of accumulated financial losses combined to erase the ISL’s market value almost overnight.
For CFG, this uncertainty was fatal to the investment thesis. Mumbai City FC generated approximately ₹51 crore in revenue in FY2024 respectable by Indian standards but insufficient when weighed against rising operational costs and CFG’s global financial realities. The group reported overall losses of £122.2 million in the 2023–24 season, with staff costs exceeding £664 million across its network. In such a context, maintaining a flagship Indian club in a league without a broadcast deal or calendar became indefensible. The project shifted from a strategic growth asset to a balance-sheet liability.
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With CFG’s withdrawal, Mumbai City FC will revert to the Kapoor–Parekh ownership group. While Ranbir Kapoor’s passion for football is well known, the club now faces life without CFG’s global scouting systems, analytics-driven recruitment, and institutional know-how. The risk is not just competitive decline but a regression to the instability that defined much of Indian club football before 2014.
The deeper issue, however, lies within Indian football’s governance architecture. ISL clubs have long argued that restrictive clauses in the AIFF constitution prevent the emergence of a modern, club-led league structure. In December 2025, twelve ISL clubs formally sought amendments to allow a Premier League–style model, where clubs collectively own and operate the league through a dedicated company. The proposal was rejected by the AIFF General Body, reinforcing the administrative deadlock and leaving the federation attempting a “DIY” approach to running a professional league.
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This paralysis has had immediate human consequences. Player contracts have been paused, salaries delayed, and entire seasons placed in doubt. The uncertainty has affected not just elite players but hundreds of coaches, analysts, and support staff whose livelihoods depend on a functioning league. Industry insiders describe a growing sense of distress and career stagnation as professionals risk losing peak years to administrative inertia.
CFG’s response has been telling. While exiting club ownership, it has doubled down on an asset-light strategy through Manchester City Football Schools in Kolkata and Bengaluru. These academies allow the brand to remain present in India, focusing on grassroots development and brand growth without exposure to league-level risk. The contrast is stark: India is seen as a market worth engaging with, but not one worth investing in at the professional level under current conditions.
The broader implications are severe. CFG’s exit is likely to depress franchise valuations, deter sponsors, and discourage other global football groups from entering India. More importantly, it signals a loss of credibility. When global capital decides that the risk is unquantifiable, recovery becomes exponentially harder.
Ultimately, CFG’s departure is the strongest indictment yet of Indian football’s institutional model. The optimism of 2019 has given way to the reality of 2025 a system paralysed by governance failures and commercial uncertainty. Unless there is fundamental reform that empowers clubs, restores commercial clarity, and aligns Indian football with global best practices, this will not be the last major exit. The warning has been sounded, and it is impossible to ignore.
