When the All India Football Federation (AIFF) opened its commercial rights ISL tender for the Indian Super League (ISL) 2025–40 cycle, it expected to usher in a new era of transparency and independence.
Instead, the process ended in a stunning zero-bid outcome not a single company, including long-time partner FSDL, submitted a proposal by the November 7 deadline. Behind this commercial failure lies a fundamental misunderstanding of market realities, operational burdens, and governance trust. What could have been an opportunity to reset Indian football’s commercial structure has turned into a crisis that threatens the sport’s financial ecosystem and the relationship between the federation and its stakeholders.
The Economics Don’t Add Up
At the heart of the problem lies the AIFF’s unrealistic financial demand: a minimum guaranteed payment (MG) of ₹37.5 crore per year or 5% of gross revenue, whichever is higher. On top of this, the successful bidder would shoulder massive advertising, operations, and labour costs a structure that simply doesn’t make business sense in the current football economy.
For any investor, breaking even under these conditions would take at least four years, even under optimistic projections. The ISL has never been a profitable property. Broadcasters have historically incurred heavy losses estimated at over ₹100 crore annually while the league’s digital viewership remains limited. Yet, the AIFF’s Request for Proposal (RFP) sought long-term financial guarantees akin to cricket’s IPL, without offering the same commercial stability or audience base.
The mandatory 15-year contract only compounded the problem. Few investors in global sport would commit to a decade-and-a-half of operational risk in a volatile market, especially when the federation itself missed Supreme Court mandated deadlines and displayed administrative unpredictability.
Clauses That Deepen the Divide
The tender’s legal framework adds another layer of friction between the bidder, participating teams, and players. Two clauses, in particular, have raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest and control.
“Participating Teams will declare details of existing sponsorships and duration of the same within seven (7) days of execution of this Agreement. Participating Teams cannot sign new sponsorship agreements with competitors of any Official Licensee without the express written consent of the Company.”
This clause effectively gives the commercial rights holder the bidder veto power over a team’s sponsorship portfolio. While intended to prevent brand conflicts, it restricts clubs’ ability to generate revenue independently. For teams already struggling to stay afloat, such a restriction could be devastating.
A second clause expands oversight further:
“All Participating Teams shall be required to disclose to the Governing Council any individual sponsorship or endorsement agreements entered into between a Participating Player and the Participating Team or its subsidiaries, affiliates, or ultimate beneficial owners. The Governing Council reserves the right to review such agreements and take appropriate actions if the terms significantly exceed the prevailing market rates.”
On paper, this aims to curb inflated player endorsement deals that could distort financial parity. But in practice, it hands disproportionate power to the governing body potentially inviting disputes over player autonomy, team control, and commercial confidentiality. For a new bidder, this dynamic translates into high administrative friction and low operational flexibility both deal-breakers in a commercial negotiation.
Why No One Bid
Four entities FSDL, FanCode, Conscient, and a foreign consortium were reportedly part of pre-bid discussions. None followed through.
For FSDL, Reliance’s long-term investment in the ISL was built on a closed franchise model that guaranteed revenue stability. The new structure, which introduces promotion and relegation (P&R) from the 2025–26 season, dismantles that foundation. P&R may be good for sporting merit, but from an investor’s standpoint, it introduces financial chaos the threat of relegation means potential loss of sponsor value, broadcast appeal, and brand equity overnight.
FanCode and other newer entrants were deterred by the steep financial floor, the ₹250 crore net worth eligibility clause, and the heavy operational mandates like 2.5–5% mandatory grassroots investment. Combined with the AIFF’s governance delays, the risk-reward equation simply didn’t hold.
In short, the AIFF wanted a partner to absorb the league’s financial burden, execute its reform agenda, and guarantee revenue all while navigating structural uncertainty and public scrutiny. No rational investor would take that deal.
The Fallout for Teams and the League
With no commercial rights partner in place, the financial backbone of the 2025–26 ISL season has collapsed. Clubs, already operating on thin budgets, face frozen revenues and halted cash flow. Reports suggest several have delayed salaries or paused operations entirely. The clauses around sponsorship disclosure could further strain relations between teams and the eventual rights holder. If enforced rigidly, they risk eroding club autonomy and discouraging independent commercial partnerships effectively centralising control in the hands of the bidder and the AIFF. For a league that depends on private clubs’ financial investment and marketing strength, such restrictions could be counterproductive.
The AIFF, meanwhile, loses its ₹37.5 crore guaranteed annual income a significant blow to its own operational budget. Without a partner, the federation will struggle to fund grassroots programs, support promotion-relegation logistics, or meet its commitments to clubs.
The tender fiasco has exposed more than just flawed economics it has revealed a crisis of credibility. The Supreme Court had mandated the AIFF to finalise a new partner by October 15, 2025. The federation missed the deadline, releasing the RFP a day late. Under judicial oversight and with KPMG as consultant, this delay became an unmistakable red flag for investors. Adding to the chaos, ten ISL clubs wrote a letter accusing the AIFF of a “breach of trust” and warning that the delays had made “financial planning, sponsorship discussions, and player commitments nearly impossible.”
The absence of key Kolkata clubs from the letter pointed to a divided ecosystem further weakening the collective voice of the stakeholders.
The zero-bid result, coming after months of mismanagement, marks a clear governance failure. It sends a damaging message to potential investors in Indian football and, more broadly, to those in India’s non-cricket sports ecosystem.
Where Does Indian Football Go From Here?
The AIFF now faces two unenviable choices: reissue the tender with more realistic terms or assume temporary operational control of the league at a reduced scale. A shorter contract (5+5 years), performance-linked revenue model (instead of fixed MG), and removal of grassroots investment from the commercial partner’s ledger could make a re-tender feasible. Equally important is the need to rebuild trust. The federation must establish transparent communication with clubs, streamline governance, and separate its reform goals from commercial negotiations. Without restoring confidence, even a revised tender may not attract credible bids.
For now, Indian football stands at a crossroads. The AIFF’s attempt to monetise reform through an inflated tender has backfired, leaving clubs anxious, investors cautious, and the sport’s top league in limbo.
Unless the federation recalibrates its approach to balance financial realism with institutional accountability, the ISL risks drifting into another lost season one that could set back Indian football’s progress by years.
