Building for Excellence: How India Is Structuring Its Road to the 2026 Asian Games

India’s preparation for the 2026 Asian Games in Aichi–Nagoya marks a decisive shift in how the country approaches multi-sport events.

Scheduled from September 19 to October 4, 2026, the Games come on the back of India’s historic outing at Hangzhou 2023, where the contingent crossed the 100-medal mark for the first time. That breakthrough has now reset expectations and policy.

The guiding principle for Aichi–Nagoya is clear: ** excellence over participation **  .

At the heart of this shift is governance. For the first time, the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MYAS) has constituted a Unified Oversight Committee (UOC) more than two years ahead of the Games. This 15-member body acts as a single decision-making platform, designed to eliminate the fragmented coordination that has historically plagued India’s preparations for multi-sport events.

Chaired by the Secretary (Sports) and co-chaired by IOA President PT Usha, the committee integrates the government, the Indian Olympic Association, the Mission Olympic Cell, Sports Authority of India, and high-performance experts into one structure  .

The early formation of the UOC addresses a long-standing weakness in Indian sports administration. In previous cycles, delayed approvals, last-minute funding, and disputes between institutions often disrupted athlete preparation. The new model emphasizes continuity regular reviews, early identification of gaps, and proactive logistical planning.

Importantly, the delegation leadership itself is embedded within the committee. Sahdev Yadav has been appointed Chef de Mission, with Achanta Sharath Kamal serving as Deputy Chef de Mission, ensuring that feedback from athletes and team officials directly informs strategic decisions.

A defining feature of the Aichi–Nagoya plan is the dual funding architecture. While the long-standing Target Olympic Podium Scheme (TOPS) continues to support athletes with Olympic medal potential, MYAS has introduced a new, Asia-focused programme the Target Asian Games Group (TAGG). TAGG is designed for athletes who demonstrate strong continental medal prospects but may not yet meet the stricter Olympic benchmarks of TOPS.

This segmentation allows resources to be used more efficiently, ensuring that Asian Games medal contenders especially in non-Olympic sports receive focused support without drawing from Olympic-specific pipelines  .

TAGG began with an initial group of 37 athletes across 16 disciplines and provides access to foreign coaches, international exposure, equipment upgrades, and specialised training camps. The logic is straightforward: sustained Asian dominance requires tailored preparation, not a one-size-fits-all Olympic framework. By institutionalising TAGG early in the cycle, MYAS has created a more realistic bridge between continental success and long-term Olympic ambition.

Perhaps the most consequential policy shift lies in selection criteria. For Aichi–Nagoya, eligibility is tightly defined. In individual sports, athletes must match or exceed the 6th-place finish from the previous Asian Games or recent Senior Asian Championships within a 12-month window. Team sports must show top-eight finishes or rankings in Asia. The intent is unmistakable only those with realistic medal potential will be funded and selected  .

This performance-based filtering extends to contingent size and support staff. MYAS has enforced strict limits, ruling out even self-funded additions to the official delegation. While the policy improves administrative efficiency and cost control, it also places responsibility squarely on the centralized system to deliver world-class support in sports science, medicine, and recovery. The UOC’s role in identifying and closing these gaps becomes critical; without elite-quality centralized services, such restrictions risk disadvantaging top athletes.

Governance stability is another underlying theme. The integration of key IOA figures into a government-chaired committee is widely seen as a mechanism to insulate Games preparation from internal administrative disputes within Indian sport. By anchoring final authority with MYAS, the preparation process is effectively ring-fenced against political or legal turbulence, a problem that has previously disrupted international campaigns.

What emerges from this architecture is a preparation model grounded in early planning, filtered excellence, and targeted investment. Unlike past cycles driven by short-term fixes, the Aichi–Nagoya strategy reflects institutional learning from Tokyo, Birmingham, and Hangzhou. Its success, however, will depend on execution particularly the quality of centralized athlete support and the UOC’s ability to maintain cohesion across stakeholders.

If those elements hold, India enters the 2026 Asian Games with a system capable not just of defending its Hangzhou gains, but potentially surpassing them.

For the first time, the ambition is supported by structure and that may be the most significant shift of all.